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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PREss-FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF A NEWSMAN NOT TO REVEAL CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION-
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
has held that a newspaper reporter called before a grand jury would
not be required to reveal confidential associations, sources, or informa-
tion that impinge upon the effective exercise of his First Amendment
right to gather news for dissemination until such time as a compelling
and overriding national interest which cannot be alternatively served
has been established to the satisfaction of the court.
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Earl Caldwell, a full time staff reporter for The New York Times,
and his publisher moved to quash or limit a Federal Grand Jury
subpoena summoning the reporter to appear and testify relative to
his interviews with officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party.
The movants asserted that the interviews were confidential and within
the scope of a relationship of trust maintained by Caldwell as a pro-
fessional journalist with members of the Panther Party. They con-
tended that under the circumstances the contents of the interviews
were protected against compulsory disclosure by the First Amendment'
and that the compelled appearance of Caldwell before the grand jury
would "have a drastic chilling and repressive effect on First Amend-
ment freedoms." 2
The district court held that Caldwell must respond to the subpoena
and testify. 3 However, it also held that, on the facts of the case, he was
entitled to a protective order limiting the scope of his grand jury
testimony. Subject to modification, he was protected from being com-
1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
2. 311 F. Supp. at 360.
3. Grand jury testimony is absolutely compulsory. All validly subpoenaed witnesses
must appear, must be sworn, and must testify. The only ground acceptable to federal
courts for a refusal by a grand jury witness to answer a question is some claim of priv-
ilege. Before the grand jury, there are no technical or procedural objections as to
hearsay, competancy, materiality, or even jurisdiction. Additionally, the witness is not
permitted to have his counsel present while he is testifying. In short, a witness before
a grand jury who cannot claim self-incrimination or some other privilege has but one
legal course of action: he must answer each question truthfully and to the best of his
ability. See the excellent article Silverstein, Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the Fifth
Amendment, 1960 WASH. U.L. REV. 215, 216-17 (1960).
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pelled to disclose information received as a journalist through confi-
dential relationships developed for the purpose of gathering news. This
is the first case to hold that there exists a constitutionally protected
right of a member of the press to refuse to disclose confidential sources
of information.4
The opinion in the instant case first pointed out that the issues
presented went to the very core of the First Amendment in the area of
freedom of the press and the scope of the journalist's privilege,5 issues
which the Supreme Court of the United States has not fully explored
and decided.6 The court, in ordering that the reporter need not reveal
confidential associations that impinge upon the effective exercise of
his First Amendment right to gather news, 7 merely assumed that there
is a First Amendment right to gather news, as distinguished from pub-
lishing or disseminating news. The existence and the extent of a con-
stitutionally protected right of the press to gather news remains judi-
cially unsettled. There has been no definitive Supreme Court ruling
on this point."
In the court's protective order,9 the following findings of fact were
made: the testimony sought from Mr. Caldwell concerned information
about the Black Panther Party which he had obtained through confi-
4. In arriving at this decision, the court cited no authority but rather relied on as-
sumptions of law and findings of fact.
5. Briefly stated, the "journalist's privilege" is the aasserted right of a journalist, news
man, or reporter to refuse to disclose the source of his information when asked to do so
during a judicial proceeding, such as when testifying before a grand jury or at a trial, in
answering interrogatories, or when being deposed.
6. The constitutional question of a journalist's privilege based on the First Amend-
ment has never been considered by the Supreme Court. In Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), the very first case in which the claim of
privilege was constitutionally based, the Supreme Court declined review. This same con-
stitutional issue was raised in an unreported Colorado case, In re Murphy, wherein a
reporter was held in contempt for refusing to disclose her confidential source of news.
But again, certiorari was denied. Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). See In re
Goodfader's Appeal, 367 P.2d 472, 479 n. 3, 498 (Hawaii 1961). State v. Buchanan, 436
P.2d 729 (Ore.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968), was the last case in which the claim of
a constitutional right by a reporter not to disclose was raised. Here again the Supreme
Court declined review.
7. To assure the effectuation of the journalist's privilege it "created," the court's order
permitted the reporter to consult with his counsel at any time during his appearance
before the grand jury. Normally, a witness before the grand jury is left to his own devices
in raising a claim of privilege, even that of self-incrimination. This is due to the fact that
only the members of the grand jury, the prosecuting attorney, the witness then testifying,
and a stenographer are permitted to be present in the grand jury room during the taking
of testimony. See Federal Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 3. It is well settled that a
witness before an investigatory body such as a grand jury has no constitutional right to
be represented by counsel. National Land & Investment Co. v. Specter, 304 F. Supp. 1004
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
8. See Note, Right of News Media Personnel to Refuse to Disclose Confidential Sources
of Information, 61 MicH. L. REv. 184, 186-89 & nn. 12-23 (1962).
9. 311 F. Supp. at 361-62.
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dential relationships which he had developed as a professional jour-
nalist; that these confidential relationships are indispensable in gather-
ing and publishing the news ; that compelled disclosure of this informa-
tion would jeopardize those relationships and impair his ability to
gather and publish the news; 10 and that the Government had shown
no compelling or overriding interest in requiring his testimony.'1 Sim-
ply stated, having assumed that there is a constitutional right to gather
news, and, having found as a fact that forced disclosure of confidential
information would impair this right, the court decided to protect the
right until some national interest should require its nullification.
At common law there clearly was no privilege by which a journalist
could refuse to disclose confidential information for use as evidence.' 2
The state courts have uniformly held that, in the absence of a
statute,13 journalists have no privilege to conceal their source of infor-
mation.14 However, these state courts, until quite recently never con-
sidered a constitutional claim of privilege. 5 The early claims of a
10. The court here assumed that the reporter would have testified, as to the confi-
dential information he had received, in the absence of a protection order. But see note
16 infra; see Author's Note infra.
11. This was apparently an unconscious application of the "balancing test" discussed
further on in this case note.
12. See Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right
to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REV. 243, 246 & n. 7 (1968), citing Annot., 102 A.L.R. 771 (1936),
Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 591 (1966); 8 WcssoIR, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Numerous unreported cases are collected in the comprehensive 1949 New York Law Re-
vision Commission Report 23-168. See also W. ARTHUR and R. CROSSMAN, THE LAW OF
NEWSPAPERS 257-59 (1940); Note, The Right of a Newspaper to Refrain from Divulging the
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61 (1950); Note, supra note 8, at 184-85 & n. 4.
For a small and curious English common law exception exempting a newspaper publisher
from disclosing the identity of his informant during discovery in libel actions where the
question of malice or fair comment is in issue, see Carter, The Journalist, His Informant
and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1111 (1960).
13. At present thirteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania)
have legislation which creates a statutory right of newsmen to reveal the contents of a
communication without being required to reveal its source. See State v. Buchanan, 436
P.2d at 732 n. 17. For a table illustrating the scope of the twelve privilege statutes then
in existence (Louisiana has the newest), see Note, The Journalist and His Confidential
Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege Be Allowed, 35 NEB. L. REv. 562, 564-66 n. 10
(1956). Most of the privilege statutes are closely patterned after the Maryland law, adopted
in 1896, which was the first. For a discussion of the scope of these statutes, see The Right
of a Newsman, supra note 12. These statutes are criticized as being to broad since, once
a journalist qualifies within the mechanical definitions of the statute, he usually has the
absolute right to refuse to identify his source, should he so choose.
14. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N.Y. County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415, 102
A.L.R. 769 (1936); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Clein v. State, 52
So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897).
15. The one exception is Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), reversing 211
Fed. 492 (S.D. N.Y. 1914) (L. Hand, J.), the only case wherein a court has upheld the
right of an editor to refuse to reveal his source of information upon a claim against
self-incrimination asserted under the Fifth Amendment. Burdick had published a series
508
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privilege not to disclose sources were usually evidentiary ones based
upon an assertion of honor, an assertion of confidence, or an assertion
of the journalist's code of ethics. 16 None of these have been accepted by
the courts. As was stated in Plunkett v. Hamilton:17
In the early English practice it was not uncommon for a person to
claim a privilege against answering a question, on the ground
that he had received the information in confidence and had
pledged himself not to divulge it. This claim, which was some-
times called the "point of honor," was considered and overruled
in 1776 in the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586, and
again in 1777 in Hill's Trial, 20 How St. Tr. 1362. Professor Wig-
more states that "the 'point of honor' thus disappeared forever as
a motive for recognizing a privilege."' 8
However, the status of the journalist's privilege at common law can-
not be used as authority in determining whether such a privilege
should or should not be held to exist in the United States under our
First Amendment at the present time.
That this historical contention is dubious has been persuasively
argued elsewhere .... [O]ne of the objects of the Revolution was
to get rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of
the press .... 19
... "[T]he state of the press *** under the common law, can-
not * * * be the standard of its freedom in the United States. 20
of stories about customs fraud, was summoned before a grand jury, but refused to re-
veal his sources on the ground of self-incrimination. This was obviously a subterfuge,
because he wouldn't have exposed a situation in which he himself was criminally involved.
It is interesting to note that Burdick's claim of possible incrimination was accepted at
the grand jury level. The only issue on appeal was the effect of his refusal to accept a
full and unconditional pardon signed by President Woodrow Wilson. The case turned on
an error committed by the United States Attorney. Had Burdick been granted immunity
from prosecution rather than a pardon, he could have been compelled to testify or be
held in contempt of court for refusal to do so.
16. The CODE OF ETHIcs OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUIDE, adopted in 1934, states:
"Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential in-
formation in court or before judicial or investigating bodies . . . " Judicial comment on
this canon has been to the effect that, though it is worthy of respect and well-founded,
it is subject to the qualification that it must yield to the interests of justice. In re Wayne,
4 Hawaii 475, 476 (D.C. 1914).
17. 136 Ga. -, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (1911).
18. The court in In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii 475, 477 (D.C. 1914), also citing 4 WicMotE,
EvmENcE § 2286, at 3186-87, said:
In general, the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence,
or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege.
This rule is not questioned to-day [sic]. No pledge of privacy, nor oath of secrecy,
can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.
This has come about by the adoption of the legal maxim, as worded by Lord Hardwicke,
that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." In re Wayne, supra at 477.
19. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
20. Id., quoting from VI WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802, 387.
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Though ". . . the First Amendment has the power of growing to meet
new needs... "'21 it is subject to the qualification that freedom of the
press is not an absolute right.22 In deciding upon the extent to which a
journalist's privilege will be given protection, once it is ascertained that
there exists a constitutional basis for such a privilege, a "balancing test"
should be applied to weigh the personal constitutional rights against
the rights of the public. Here there is the conflict of the communica-
tional freedoms with the public interest in the fair administration of
justice.23 Under the balancing test, "the duty of the courts is to deter-
mine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater pro-
tection under the particular circumstances presented. 2 4
In Garland v. Torre,25 the leading case concerning a newspaperman's
constitutional privilege to withhold sources, such a test was uncon-
sciously applied. In that case actress Judy Garland was suing Columbia
Broadcasting System for breach of contract and for false and defama-
tory statements allegedly made by a CBS executive and published by
columnist Marie Torre, who refused to identify her source during a
deposition. Upon her refusal to name the executive in court, she was
held in criminal contempt. 26 It should be stressed that on review the
court of appeals
accept[ed] at the outset the hypothesis that compulsory disclosure
of a journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an
abridgment of press freedom by imposing some limitation on the
availability of news.27
However, the question asked of Torre went to the heart of Garland's
case, and the information sought could not reasonably be obtained by
other means. Although the court assumed that there was a First
Amendment basis for a journalist's privilege, it applied a balancing
21. Chafee, Book Review (of Meiklejohn's FaEE SPEFcH), 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 898
(1949).
22. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
23. See Note, Constitutional Law: Privilege of Newsman to Conceal Source of Informa-
tion, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 453, 454 (1962).
24. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
25. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). See note 6 supra.
26. Being held in civil contempt can result in summary confinement of the witness
until such time as he agrees to abide by the court's order and answer the question asked,
or until the term of the grand jury expires if the contempt citation is a result of refusing
to answer the grand jury. A criminal contempt conviction is the basis for a specific sen-
tence, either confinement for a definite periodor a fine or both. See Federal Grand Jury
Testimony, supra note 3, at 236. Miss Torte was sentenced to confinement for ten days.
27. Garland v. Torte, 259 F.2d at 548.
51.
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test and found that the interests of justice outweighed the encroach-
ment on freedom of the press.
The next case in which the constitutional question of a journali-st's
privilege arose was In re Goodfader's Appeal.28 A former personnel
director instituted an action against the members of a civil service
commission for her reinstatement, alleging that her ouster was arbi-
trary and illegal. The basis of her complaint was that three of the com-
mission members had secretly contrived and agreed to fire her without
notice. A reporter, who had been present at the commission meeting
dismissing the plaintiff, stated during his deposition that he had re-
ceived prior confidential information that an attempt to fire her would
be made. The court considered it likely that whoever had given the
reporter this information had information traceable to one of the com-
missioners voting for her ouster. However, the reporter refused to re-
veal his source. In affirming the order compelling disclosure, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii stated that
in the absence of any authoritative ruling by the [United States
Supreme Court], we will assume, for the purposes of this case, that
the forced disclosure of a reporter's confidential source of informa-
tion may, to some extent, constitute an impairment of the freedom
of the press.29
To justify the impairment the court said it felt that the information
sought was sufficiently important and that the plaintiff had made a
sufficient attempt to obtain this information elsewhere.30 The individ-
ual interest involved had been weighed against the public interest
affected.31 Upon the facts the balance favored the latter-the proper
administration of justice.
The last case prior to the instant one in which the constitutional issue
was raised was State v. Buchanan.3 2 A writer for a student newspaper
had promised seven marijuana users that she would not reveal their
identities if they would permit her to interview them for publication.
She refused to reveal their names to a grand jury investigating the
problem and was given a $300 contempt fine. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Oregon affirmed the contempt citation, basing its decision on
an equal-protection argument and the absence of a statute granting a
28. 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
29. Id. at 329, 367 P.2d at 480.
30. Id. at 339, 367 P.2d at 485.
31. Id. at 325, 367 P.2d at 478.
32. 436 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1968). See note 6 supra.
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journalistic privilege. The court argued that it would be violating
equal-protection concepts of the constitution if it created a special
privilege for news gatherers possessing credentials while denying it to
other persons. This argument was presented without realizing that the
press is the one industry specifically selected for protection by the Con-
stitution. The court was also more concerned with the problem of
determining who would possess the privilege than with determining
the existence of the privilege itself. The decision cited Garland and
Goodfader, but only insofar as those cases rejected the old evidentiary
claims of privilege. Buchanan did not recognize the modern trend
toward accepting the existence of a First Amendment privilege and
then applying a balancing test on the facts. Rather, it held that nothing
in the state or federal constitution compelled the court, in the absence
of statute, to recognize such a privilege.
Caldwell is directly in line with the modern trend. It recognized a
qualified First Amendment right not to disclose a newsman's source. It
balanced this right as weighted by the facts against the government's
interest in obtaining the information. It was the first decision to find
that the balance fell in favor of supporting the qualified journalist's
privilege. As a practical matter, however, the effects of an absolute
journalist's privilege have existed for some time. By virtue of the news-
man's code, the identity of the informant is almost never revealed.3 3
The existence or non-existence of the privilege would seem to have
little effect then on the due administration of justice.34 While it is not
valid to argue that a privilege should exist in the law because it exists
in effect, the only possible remaining purpose of a limited journalist's
privilege is to protect the newsman from what is popularly considered
to be judicial abuse when he refuses to violate his code.35
The guidelines issued by Attorney General John Mitchell for
Justice Department use in subpoenaing newsmen 36 directly paralleled
33. The Newsman's Code, supra note 12, at 252. Only two cases have been discovered
in which reporters have revealed their sources after being cited for contempt. After the
court in In re Wayne, 4 Hawaii 475, 478 note (D.C. 1914), had made its opinion (supra
note 18), Mr. Wayne immediately purged himself of any possible contempt by not only
giving the desired information but by producing his informant as a witness before the
grand jury. In the case Eddie Barr (unreported), N.Y. Times, March 13, 1931, p. 25, col. 8,
the commitment was of indefinite duration, the reporter to be released when he purged
himself by answering the question. Because of the possibility of unlimited imprisonment,
Barr answered. The Right of a Newsman, supra note 12, at 62 n. 9.
54. The journalist and His confidential Source, supra note 13, at 578.
35. The Right of a Newsman, supra note 12, at 83. It was public reaction to the courts'
making of martyrs of members of the Fourth Estate that caused many states to adopt their
privilege statutes.
36. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 17, 1970, at 8, col. 1.
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the rule announced in Caldwell. The guidelines note that the use of
compulsory process against journalists may have a chilling effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights. They provide that the information
sought must be essential to a successful investigation and that an at-
tempt should first have been made to obtain the information from
other sources. It is submitted that, due to this judicial and executive
recognition, the First Amendment may now be used by a newsman to
protect himself from forced disclosures which are only possibly relevant
and are not of sufficient value to justify the possible deterrent to the
gathering of news. However, where the information sought from the
reporter is essential and can be obtained only from him, and where a
national interest has been shown in its procurement, the freedom of
the press right must yield to the administration of justice even if it
results in the reporter losing some of his sources of information.
[Author's Note: In the above noted case, Caldwell had moved to
quash the subpoena. The district court had denied that motion and
directed compliance with the supoena subject to the protective order.
Caldwell appealed that decision. The appeal was dismissed apparently
on the ground that the order was not appealable. Caldwell's disregard
of the order requiring his attendance at the grand jury resulted in a
judgment of contempt, from which he appealed. This is all reported in
Caldwell v. United States,37 which was decided subsequent to the
completion of this case note. The issue on appeal there was not the
scope of the interrogation to which he must submit but whether he
need attend at all. In reversing his contempt citation and in vacating
the order requiring his attendance, the circuit court agreed with the
district court that the First Amendment requires a qualified journalist's
privilege. However, the court went further and found that mere atten-
dance cannot be required unless the Government demonstrates a
compelling need for the witness's presence prior to the issuance of the
subpoena.38 The court reasoned that, when a reporter is called to
testify behind closed doors, the secrecy that surrounds grand jury testi-
mony necessarily introduces uncertainty into the minds of those who
fear a betrayal of their confidences. This anticipated loss of future
communication fell under the protection of the public's First Amend-
37. No. 26,025 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1970).
38. The customary procedure is to require the witness to seek a protective order after
appearing before the grand jury.
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ment right to be informed. It was noted in the case that the Govern-
ment, while not conceding the validity or propriety of the qualified
privilege granted Caldwell, did not seek review of the district court's
protective order due to the Justice Department guidelines issued subse-
quent to that order.]
Robert Thomas Barletta
LABOR LAw-NLRB's REMEDIAL PowERs-The United States Supreme
Court held that while the National Labor Relations Board does have
power under the Labor Management Relations Act to require em-
ployers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a
company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision
of a collective bargaining agreement.
H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99 (1970).
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,' pro-
vides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the rep-
resentative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.., but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession....
On October 5, 1961, the United Steelworkers of America was certi-
fied by the NLRB as the bargaining representative of the approxi-
mately 300 production and maintenance employees of the H. K. Porter
Company's Danville, Virginia plant. As of September, 1964, the union
had sought and received one bargaining order against the employer 2
but no contract had yet been concluded between the parties. The three
unresolved issues as of this date were wages, health insurance and
"checkoff," the deduction by the employer of union dues from the
paychecks of employees who authorized such a deduction. The 300
employees comprising the bargaining unit lived within a radius of 35 to
40 miles of the plant. Since the union had no clerical staff in Danville
and its closest office was in Roanoke, approximately 85 miles away, it
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1947).
2. H. K. Porter Co., 56 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1964).
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